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Abstract 
The Federal Government spent over $470 billion on procurement in FY 2016. Spending 
of this magnitude creates opportunities for implementing selected national policies. For 
instance, current law requires that low-cost acquisitions be reserved exclusively for small 
business concerns, with qualifying businesses assuming the role of prime contractor. However, 
the pursuit of admirable social goals such as this may not always be rational from an economic 
or technical standpoint.   
This report analyzes the distribution of small business procurement across industry 
sectors using data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). We show that a 
relatively small number of large firms dominate the federal contracting landscape in certain 
sectors, such as defense, and account for a significant proportion of procurement spending. 
Accordingly, set-aside policy has a disparate impact on the remainder of the spending, 
concentrating it into certain industry sectors where there are greater opportunities for small 
businesses, limiting free and open competition, and creating a series of unintended 
consequences for government (e.g. contracting and economic inefficiency) and small 




CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - ii - 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - iii - 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
Acknowledgements 
This research was partially sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School, and we are 
especially grateful for the support and encouragement provided by RADM (Retired) Jim 
Greene and Professor Keith Snider. We are especially grateful for the support of the 
interviewed firms, and the current and former federal government officials, for their 
participation and the valuable insights they provided.  We would also like to thank our co-




CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - iv - 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - v - 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
About the Authors 
William Lucyshyn is a Research Professor and the Director of Research at the Center 
for Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, University of 
Maryland. In this position, he directs research on critical policy issues related to the 
increasingly complex problems associated with improving public-sector management and 
operations, and with how government works with private enterprise. Current projects include 
modernizing government supply-chain management, identifying government sourcing and 
acquisition best practices, and analyzing Department of Defense business modernization and 
transformation. Previously, Mr. Lucyshyn served as a Program Manager and the Principal 
Technical Advisor to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) on the identification, selection, research, development, and prototype production of 
advanced technology projects. 
Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the U.S. Air 
Force. Mr. Lucyshyn received his Bachelor degree in Engineering Science from the City 
University of New York and earned his Master’s degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Air 
Force Institute of Technology. He has authored numerous reports, book chapters, and journal 
articles. 
John Rigilano is a faculty research associate at the Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise. He received his Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland’s School 
of Public Policy in 2011, where he also served as a graduate research associate at CPPPE. Prior 
to his time at UMD, Mr. Rigilano received his Bachelor of Arts from Penn State University in 
2004 with a major in Anthropology. During his time at CPPPE, he has coauthored and 
contributed to numerous reports. 
  
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - vi - 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - vii - 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
II. Background ............................................................................................................................. 3 
Set-Aside Goals ........................................................................................................................ 5 
SBA Size Standards ................................................................................................................. 9 
Subcontracting Rules.............................................................................................................. 11 
III. Small Business Representation in Federal Contracting ....................................................... 13 
The Small Business Potential ................................................................................................. 15 
Growth of Small Business in the Professional Services Sector ............................................. 19 
IV. Unintended Consequences ................................................................................................... 23 
Uneven and unsustainable growth.......................................................................................... 23 
Barriers to entry ...................................................................................................................... 26 
Contracting and economic inefficiency.................................................................................. 31 
V. Findings and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 37 




CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of Public Policy - viii - 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of policy  1 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
I. Introduction 
The Federal Government, on average, spent half a trillion dollars annually on 
procurement over the last decade ($470 billion in FY 2016), roughly 40% more than what was 
spent in real terms during the 1990s (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Federal contract spending, action obligations in then-year $billions, 1995-2016 (analysis of FPDS 
data)  
Spending of this magnitude creates opportunities for implementing socio-economic 
policies aimed at promoting small businesses, especially those owned by members of 
historically-disadvantaged groups (e.g. minorities, women). In 1988, Congress began 
requiring that “the President shall annually establish Government-wide goals for [small 
business] procurement” at specified minimum percentages (Beale, 2014).  
This report analyzes the distribution of procurement across industry sectors using data 
from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). We show that a relatively small number 
of large firms dominate the federal contracting landscape in certain sectors, such as defense, 
and account for a significant proportion of procurement spending. Accordingly, small 
business procurement policy has a disparate impact on the remainder of the spending, 
concentrating it into industry sectors where there are greater opportunities for small business. 
Unfortunately, this policy often limits free and open competition in the affected sectors, and 
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inefficiency) and small businesses (e.g. uneven and unsustainable growth and barriers to entry 
into the federal contracting space). 
The advantages of small business—innovation and agility—have been recognized for 
decades. Small business is the “driver and engine of growth” and the “lifeblood of our 
economy” (Obama, 2014). However, there are indications that current policy may fall short of 
its intended objectives: promoting the growth and prosperity of small business, improving 
government acquisitions efficiency, and fostering economic growth.  
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II. Background  
The Small Business Act of 1953 established the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
as an independent agency of the federal government to “aid, counsel, assist, and protect, 
insofar as is possible, the interests of small business concerns in order to: 
• Preserve free competitive enterprise; 
• Ensure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for 
goods and services for the Government (including but not limited to contracts or 
subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be placed with small-business 
enterprises; 
• Ensure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such 
enterprises; and 
• Maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation” (15 U.S.C. & 631). 
The Small Business Act also recognizes that this policy is directly tied to the health of the 
nation’s Industrial Base. This policy is reflected in Part 19 of the FAR.  
 
A small business must meet the following criteria to qualify under SBA requirements: 
• Meets SBA industry-specific size standards 
• Is organized for profit; 
• Has a place of business in the U.S.; 
• Operates primarily within the U.S. or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. 
economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials or labor; 
• Is independently owned and operated; and 
• Is not dominant in its field on a national basis. (SBA, 2015) 
Since its creation, the role of the SBA has grown significantly through the creation of 
programs designed to assist the development of small businesses. These programs include 
financial assistance through loan guarantees and bonding programs; federal contract 
procurement assistance, management assistance, and specialized outreach to women, 
minorities and armed forces veterans.  
The federal government has implemented two policies—the so-called “Rule of Two” 
and small business “set-aside” goals—in order to ensure that that small businesses are 
provided the opportunity to compete for federal contracts.   
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The “Rule of Two” 
According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 19.201 the government shall 
provide “maximum practicable opportunities in its acquisitions to small business” In fact, 
federal agencies’ contracting officers must set aside any and all acquisitions above the micro-
purchase threshold of $3,500 provided that there is a reasonable expectation, based on market 
research, that offers from at least two responsible small business concerns will be received at 
fair market prices (FAR 19.502). Any decision to not set aside a particular acquisition must 






















Enforcing the “Rule of Two” 
In 1998, application of the ‘Rule of Two’ became the subject of a significant ruling in 
the implementation of small business set asides. At issue was a solicitation for “mobile 
reuse centers” for the storage of hazardous materials. The initial solicitation was 
unrestricted—i.e. subjected to full and open competition. A small business, Safety 
Storage, Inc., wrote to the contracting agency requesting the solicitation be reissued as 
a small business set aside. The letter identified similar products that Safety Storage and 
another local business had manufactured for a number of years. 
The contracting agency, Defense Industry Supply Center, rejected Safety Storage’s 
request, arguing that small businesses had never manufactured the mobile reuse centers 
with the requested specifications. Safety Storage protested the decision to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
In its ruling, the GAO concluded that “the record does not show that the contracting 
officer reasonably investigated whether the procurement could be set aside for 
exclusive small business participation.” Specifically, there was no evidence to suggest 
that the small businesses were incapable, technically or otherwise, of testing and 
supplying the mobile reuse centers. Furthermore, the GAO found that the contracting 
officer had failed to contact the small businesses that responded to the solicitation, the 
SBA, or the agency’s Small Business Utilization Specialist. Significantly, the GAO 
ruled that any determination against a set-aside must be supported by objective facts 
and that that burden had not been met. 
The GAO’s decision in the Safety Storage case lent strength to the FAR’s ‘Rule of 
Two.’ Subsequent rulings have clarified what constitutes sufficient cause to reject a 
set-aside, including prior procurement history, market surveys, and on-site review by 
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Set-Aside Goals 
In addition, each year the government sets a government-wide small business prime 
contracting goal. The initial government-wide goal for small business procurement, established 
in 1988, was set “at not less than 20 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards.”  In 
1997, the goal was raised to 23%.  
In 2013, the government achieved the 23% goal for the first time since 2005, 
prompting the Small Business Administration (SBA) to assert that “When we hit our small 
business procurement target, it’s a win…small businesses get the revenue they need to grow 
and create jobs, and the federal government gets the chance to work with some of the most 
responsive, innovative and nimble companies in the U.S.” (Harrison, 2014).  
It should be noted that the goal was met even though spending on contracting with 
small business actually declined in 2013. The goal was met again in 2014 and 2015. The goal 
was again met in 2014 and 2015 despite, and likely because of, the continued decline in 
contracting with traditional firms (see Figure 2). That the government has met its target as of 
late does not, then, suggest that the overall health of small business has improved. 
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The government also establishes government-wide goals for small-disadvantaged 
businesses, and women-owned small businesses, historically-underutilized businesses zones 
(HUBZone) service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses. There is also a government-
wide small business subcontracting goal and subcontracting goals in each of the 
aforementioned categories. The 2015 set-aside goals and levels of achievement are shown in 











Small Business 23.00% 25.75% 
($90.7B) 
34.03% 31.30% 










Service Disabled Veteran 




HUBZone 3.00% 1.82% 
($6.4B) 
3.00% 1.82% 
Table 1. FY2015 Government-wide small business procurement goals and achievement (SBA, 2016) 
Current law also requires that federal agencies, in collaboration with the SBA, 
establish their own goals biannually in each of the categories listed in Table 1. The goals vary 
widely by agency. Table 2 lists the 2015 goals of ten agencies in the small business prime 
contracting and subcontracting categories. 
Prior to finalizing each agency’s goals, the SBA determines whether the goals, in the 
aggregate, meet or exceed the government-wide statutorily mandated goals in each of the 
categories. The critic might question why agency goals are subordinated to government-wide 
goals, rather than used to inform, if not justify, the government-wide targets. 
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Table 2. Select agencies FY 2015 small business procurement goals (SBA, 2016) 
Although the DoD has had trouble meeting its small business goals in the past, it met 
and exceeded its departmental goals for small business contracting for the first time in FY 
2014 (Figure 3 compares the small business contracting goals for the DoD to the actual 
awards). This achievement is attributed to the increased focus placed on small business 
contracting with the Better Buying Power Initiatives (Roulo, 2014).  Also, since 2011, small 
business goal achievement has been included in SES performance appraisals, for all functions 
related to acquisitions. It is not clear if these explain this recent surge, but it is clear that a 
great deal of emphasis has been placed on meeting the small business contracting goals.   
 
Figure 3. DoD Small Business Goals and Achievement 
 
Agency Prime Contracting 
Goal 
Subcontracting Goal 
Department of Agriculture 53.00% 23.00% 
Department of Defense 21.60% 36.00% 
Department of Education 20.00% 33.00% 
Department of Energy 6.00% 50.00% 
Department of Homeland Security 32.00% 41.00% 
Environmental Protection Agency 40.00% 55.00% 
General Services Administration 32.00% 29.00% 
NASA 17.00% 36.00% 
Office of Personnel Management 25.00% 55.00% 
Small Business Administration 69.00% 7.00% 
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The SBA provides each agency with an annual performance scorecard that lists 
achievement in each category along with an overall grade, using a methodology that heavily 
weights prime contracting achievement. An agency’s grade is composed of three quantitative 
measures: prime contracts (80%), subcontracts (10%), and its “progress plan” for meeting 
future goals (10%; SBA, 2016). Accordingly, comparing their letter grades cannot reveal 
which agencies relied more heavily on small business to meet their procurement needs. Below 
is the DoD’s 2016 small business procurement scorecard. 
 
 
Table 3. DoD’s 2016 small business procurement scorecard 
 
To summarize, small business participation is governed by two sets of policies that 
some consider to be redundant—the government’s qualitative (“Rule of Two”) and 
quantitative objectives (numerical set-aside goals). As indicated previously, agencies are 
already required to rely on small business to the “maximum extent practicable,” and any 
decision to not set aside a particular acquisition must rely on “objective fact.” However, the 
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SBA Size Standards 
Interpreting the significance of small business procurement goals is further 
complicated by the fact that the very definition of small business (specifically, industry size 
standards) vary by industry and change periodically.  
For instance, analysis of data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) 
reveals that in FY 2011, well over 250 small engineering services firms “graduated” from the 
small business ranks upon exceeding the relevant size standard of $4.5 million in annual 
revenue. In FY 2012, the SBA revised the standard to $14 million (one of thirty such revisions 
implemented in 2012).  
In January 2014, Civil and Structural Engineer published an article entitled 
“Congratulations! You’re ‘small’ again!” Echoing observers’ comments in other affected 
industries, the article noted that the increases were good news for many firms “that until 
recently were too big to be small, but not big enough to compete with truly large firms for 
federal procurements.” The increase in the thresholds, however, “is generally not good news 
for firms that are still slightly too large to qualify under the new thresholds because many of 
their somewhat small competitors will now have competitive advantages that the federal 
government bestows on small firms.” For larger businesses, the new thresholds can appear 
somewhat arbitrary and unfair.  
The SBA devises size standards which are expressed as the average number of 
employees over the past 12 months or average annual receipts over the past three years. The 
size standard varies by NAICS industry and is dependent on an SBA methodology that 
analyzes five primary factors within each industry: average firm size, degree of competition 
within an industry, startup costs and entry barriers, distribution of firms by size, and small 
business share in federal contracts. 
NAICS Codes 
The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by 
federal statistical agencies, including the SBA, in classifying business establishments 
for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the 
U.S. business economy. NAICS recognizes 20 industry sectors, which are separated into 
99 subsectors, 312 industry groups, and over 1000 industries, each of which is assigned 
a six-digit code. 
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Contracting officers classify each and every solicitation by an industry-level NAICS 
code that, by their determination, describes the principal purpose of the product or service. 
Accordingly, a business that qualifies as “small” under one or more NAICS codes may not 
qualify under others. As one might imagine, the procuring agency must carefully consider 
each NAICS code designation. Erroneously assigned codes constitute valid ground for bid 
protests, which can be costly for the government. 
However, NAICS code selection can be a subjective endeavor. McVay (2009) 
provides an example which would be comical in its banality if not for its real-world 
implications. He writes that “if a contracting officer decides to set aside a contract for 
paperboard boxes, should he categorize the boxes as ‘Setup Paperboard Boxes’ (NAICS code 
322213), which has a size standard of 500 employees, or as ‘Folding Paperboard Boxes’ 
(NAICS code 322212), which has a size standard of 750 employees?” (p. 185).  The most 
prevalent size standard for manufacturing industries is 500 employees; for service industries, 
it is $7 million in average annual revenue over the previous three fiscal years. Table 4 shows 
the size standard used within six industries where federal contracting is highly concentrated.  
Industry Employees Receipts 
Commercial and Institutional Construction N/A $36.5M 
Computer-related services N/A $27.5M 
Engineering Services N/A $15.0M 
Petroleum Refineries 1,500 N/A 
R&D in the Sciences 1,000 N/A 
Precious Metal Wholesalers 100   N/A 
Table 4. SBA size standards in select industries (SBA, 2016) 
McVay (2016) writes that “while a business with 500 employees or 7.0 million in 
gross revenue may not seem small, the purpose of setting the size standard at these levels is to 
allow small businesses to grow into thriving ‘medium’ businesses before losing the benefits of 
their small business size status” (p. 185). Though well-intentioned, one might question 
whether a small defense engineering firm, upon exceeding the $35 million size standard, is 
adequately positioned to compete with the likes of General Dynamics, Raytheon, Boeing, or 
Lockheed Martin whose annual revenues exceeded $12 billion, $13 billion, $19 billion, and 
$35 billion respectively.  
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
School of policy  11 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
As one might expect, the top small business recipients of federal contracting dollars 
operate, at least partially, in industries for which the size standard is expressed as number of 
employees. Typically, these industries manufacture, or otherwise provide, relatively expensive 
products. Table 5 lists the top small business recipients of federal contracting dollars in FY 
2016. 
Table 5. Top ten small business recipients of federal contracting dollars in FY 2016 (analysis of FPDS data) 
Subcontracting Rules 
Current law requires that when a small firm teams with a large firm to bid on larger 
contracts, the former is required to perform a certain percentage of the work. This law is in 
place to prevent small business from acting as a pass-through for larger firms seeking to 
exploit set-aside regulations.  
  




Bridgewater, VA Service establishment wholesalers $1.07B 
Coins ‘N Things, Inc. Virginia Beach, 
VA 





Precious metal wholesalers $708M 
Precious A-Mark 
Metals, Inc. 
Santa Monica, CA Precious metal wholesalers $576M 
Mythics, Inc. Virginia Beach, 
VA 
Computer and software stores $415M 
Carahsoft Technology  Reston, VA Software publishers $304M 
Iron Bow 
Technologies 










Other computer related services $256M 
Red River Computer Claremont, NH Other computer related services $250M 
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In June of 2016, the SBA implemented a new rule whereby a small business prime 
contractor can “take credit” for work performed by “similarly-situated” subcontractors. 
According to the SBA, a similarly-situated subcontractor is “a small business subcontractor 
that is a participant of the same small business program that the prime contractor is a certified 
participant” (e.g. woman-owned, HUBZone, etc.) and “which qualifies the prime contractor to 
receive the award.” This new rule allows small business prime contractors to perform less 
than the mandated performance percentages, provided that the subcontractor(s) are “similarly-
situated.”  
Limitations on Subcontracting   
FAR 52 states that small businesses agree, as a condition to contracting, that for  
Services at least 50% of the cost of performance will be expended for employees of the 
concern; for   
Supplies, at least 50% of the cost of manufacturing the supplies, excluding the cost of 
materials, will be performed by the concern; and that for 
General construction, at least 15% of the cost of the contract, excluding the cost of materials, 
will be performed by its own employees.   
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III. Small Business Representation in Federal Contracting   
NAICS recognizes 20 industry sectors, listed in Table 6; Figure 4, below, depicts FY 
2015 federal contract obligations by industry sector. The first thing to notice is that federal 
procurement is highly concentrated by sector, with manufacturing; professional, scientific, 
and technical services; construction; and administrative support accounting for more than 80% 
of procurement.  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting  




Wholesale Trade  
Retail Trade  
Transportation and Warehousing  
Information  
Finance and Insurance  
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services  
Management of Companies and Enterprises  
Administrative and Support 
Waste Management and Remediation Services  
Educational Services  
Health Care and Social Assistance  
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation  
Accommodation and Food Services  
Other Services 
Table 6. 20 NAICS Industry Sectors 
 
Figure 4. FY 2015 Total federal contract obligations by industry sector (analysis of FPDS data) 
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Figure 5. FY 2015 Small business federal contract obligations by industry sector (analysis of FPDS data) 
Figure 5 depicts small business federal contract obligations by industry sector. Though 
the same four sectors dominate, their relative sizes differ significantly. Two sectors, 
construction and professional, scientific, and technical services account for relatively larger 
pieces of the small business pie; manufacturing accounts for a noticeably smaller piece. 
Figure 6 compares the relative sizes of the four major sectors in each of the two procurement 
spaces (i.e. small business and “other than small business”).  
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Figure 6. Sectoral composition, small business vs. other than small business, percentage of FY 2015 action 
obligations (analysis of FPDS data) 
 
 
The Small Business Potential 
Small businesses are represented in virtually every industry sector. Indeed, over 99% 
of U.S. firms are small businesses (SBA, 2015). However, they tend to thrive in industry 
sectors that require low levels of capital investment. The mismatch between small business 
capabilities and government requirements represents a growing, albeit long-standing problem. 
In 1961, Frederic Suss, discussing the technological developments of the “fast moving space 
age,” summed it up as follows. 
As the area in which the small business can compete—commonly termed 
the small business potential—receives a smaller share of the procurement 
dollar, small concerns must receive a larger share of the potential in order 
to maintain that share of the entire “pie.” Yet since there is a limit to the 
portion of the small business potential which small firms can capture, they 
have received less and less of the entire “pie.” (Suss, 1961, p. 360) 
As Suss indicates, within the government a great deal of the “spend” is often not suitable for 
small businesses. For example, the federal government contracted close to $35 billion for 
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aircraft manufacturing in FY 2015. Only $718 million, or two percent, was awarded to small 
businesses (analysis of FPDS data, 2015). 
Table 7 depicts the relationship between total federal procurement within each sector 
and the small business share within that sector. The table shows, for example, that four 
percent of all federal contract obligations fall within the transportation and warehousing 
sector. Of that four percent, or $16 billion, in total federal contract obligations, 17%, or $2.6 
billion, is obligated to small business.  
 
 







Manufacturing 37% 13% 
Professional, Scientific, and Tech 
Services 
30% 29% 
Administrative Support 8% 23% 
Construction 7% 47% 
Transportation and Warehousing 4% 17% 
Information 3% 23% 
Finance and Insurance 3% 3% 
Wholesale Trade 2% 42% 
Waste Management and Remediation 1% 26% 
Healthcare and Social Assistance <1% 37% 
Education Services <1% 24% 
Retail Trade <1% 37% 
Other Services <1% 27% 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing <1% 43% 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, & 
Hunting 
<1% 76% 
Accommodation and Food Services <1% 20% 
Utilities <1% 9% 
Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas 
Extraction 
<1% 58% 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation <1% 67% 
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Increasing the small business opportunities within the ten sectors where federal 
procurement is below one percent of the total will have minimal impact on the overall small 
business share, especially given that in eight of these “minor” sectors, small business is 
already well represented. In terms of federal procurement, small business dominates the 
agricultural sector, with 76% of all dollars (in FY 2015) awarded to small business, but this 
figure translates to only $318 million, or less than 1% of the government’s procurement 
spending.  
The table makes it clear that any effort to increase the small business share of federal 
contracting dollars must be directed within the first four or five sectors, where the overall 
level of federal procurement is relatively high. However, there are challenges in this regard. In 
the construction sector, for example, nearly half—47%— of all contracting dollars already 
flow to small business, a figure well above SBA’s government-wide small business 
contracting goal of 23%. As for manufacturing, recent statistics confirm that the oft-
politicized decline in domestic manufacturing is particularly acute within the small business 
ranks (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8. Change in number of manufacturing firms by employment level (Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship Council, 2016)  
 
Moreover, the federal government spends the bulk of its contracting for manufacturing 
dollars in highly-specialized industries such as aerospace and weapon systems manufacturing. 
These industries require extensive capital investment, a large operating footprint, and far-
reaching logistics networks. Accordingly, small business is not well represented in these 
industries. Table 9 shows the ten manufacturing industries in which FY 2016 federal 
procurement spending was greatest. Together, these ten industries account for over 70% ($129 
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billion) of all procurement spending in the manufacturing sector; yet less than half of one 
percent was obligated to small business. 
Industry Total Contact Obligations, 
($ billions) 
Small Business Share 
($ billions) 
Aircraft manufacturing $45 $.75 
Ship building and repairing $16 $1.3 
Guided missile and space vehicle 
manufacturing 
$14 $.02 




Research, detection, navigation, 






Aircraft engine and engine parts 
manufacturing 
$6 $.18 
Petroleum Refineries $5 $.98 
Military Armored Vehicle, 
Tank, and Tank component 
manufacturing 
$4 $.37 
Ammunition (except small arms) 
manufacturing 
$4 $.40 
Table 9. The ten manufacturing industries in which FY 2016 federal procurement spending was greatest 
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Growth of Small Business in the Professional Services Sector 
It seems, then, that the potential for greater small business procurement lies primarily 
in the professional services sectors and, to a (far) lesser extent, the administrative support and 
transportation and warehousing sectors. Figure 7 depicts small business trends in the four 
major sectors over that last decade. 
 
Figure 7. Small business share (action obligations in then-year $billions) of federal contract dollars in the 
four major sectors (analysis of FPDS data) 
In terms of small business representation, the graph indicates steady growth within the 
professional services sector. It is of note that these trends are not necessarily representative of 
federal procurement in general. Figure 8 shows trends in federal contracting, excluding small 
business, in the same four sectors. Even as total spending on professional services has 
decreased approximately 25% from its high, the small business share in that sector has 
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Figure 8. Federal contracting (action obligations in then-year $billions) in the four major sectors, 
excluding small business (analysis of FPDS data) 
It is clear that small business has lost ground in the construction and manufacturing 
sectors, but has gained steadily in the professional, scientific, and technical services sector. 
Figure 9 shows the growth of the small business share of federal contracting dollars in the 
professional services sector over the last decade, from 15% in 2006 to 29% in 2016.  
 
Figure 9. Small business participation in federal contracting, professional services sector, percentage of 
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As Table 5 indicated, within the context of federal contracting, there are very few 
industry sectors capable of absorbing new small businesses. Accordingly, and as recent trends 
suggest, SBA set-aside policy will have the effect of concentrating more federal contract 
spending into the growing professional services sector. In the next section we explore the 
potential unintended consequences of SBA policy, relating individual small businesses’ 
perspectives to the data that has been presented. 
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IV. Unintended Consequences 
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that SBA set-aside policy has the effect of 
concentrating spending into the professional services sector. In this section, we highlight the 
unintended consequences that result from this concentration, as well as from SBA policies 
generally. For small firms, these can include uneven and unsustainable growth and significant 
barriers to entry; for government, unintended consequences can take the form of contracting 
and economic inefficiency. 
In an effort to contextualize our findings, we present the perspectives of professional 
services providers (small and mid-size) as well as government officials. In both cases, their 
identities have been anonymized in order to solicit candid responses. 
It should be noted upfront that all of the participants conveyed a favorable view of the concept 
of small business set asides. One small firm remarked that its view of set asides was   
Absolutely positive…It allows us to compete on a more level playing 
field. I think it’s been a great program. You look at the numbers of small 
businesses in the United States, [and] you hear time and time again that 
so much of the income and GDP comes from small businesses.  
Another noted that “if you didn’t have set asides, then you wouldn’t be able to seed 
companies.” However, when it came to the specific content of set-aside policy and its 
implementation, perspectives were more nuanced.  
Uneven and unsustainable growth 
Set-asides may enable the small business to grow more rapidly than it otherwise 
would. This growth may be uneven and unsustainable. Because the small business may have 
difficulty developing adequate depth in the provision of capabilities and other necessary 
business functions in such short order, large contracts have the potential to overwhelm its 
infrastructure and capacity. This is an increasingly likely outcome given that small businesses 
are also being awarded both a higher number and greater percentage of large contracts in the 
professional services sector (see Figure 10), a trend that is not seen in small business 
procurement generally. In 2006, small business received approximately five percent of 
contracts over $25 million; by 2016, the figure increased to over 16%, a 3 fold increase. 
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Figure 10. Number of large contracts (> $25 million) awarded annually in the professional services sector 
(analysis of FPDS data) 
 
One mid-size business with whom we spoke offered the following perspective: 
Right now, [government agencies] are just managing against numbers. 
They’re managing against quotas and objectives. I think that what’s 
needed is a healthy step back to try to understand what it is we’re trying 
to accomplish. I don’t mind having small businesses get a priority for 
some prime contracts, but having a small business award that is a 
hundred million or two hundred million a year is just ludicrous. It’s 
totally ludicrous. 
As successful small businesses increase their annual revenues, graduating from certain 
NAICS codes, they must look to compete for government set-asides in other categories, often 
those whose size standards are expressed in number of employees. There are three NAICS 
codes in the professional services with size standards expressed in number of employees: 
research and development in biotechnology (1,000); research and development in the 
physical, engineering, and life sciences; and information technology value added resellers 
(1,000).  
However, this transition may require that the small business reorient its business 
model, relinquishing the sought-after capabilities that made it successful in the first place. 
Clearly, this outcome represents a loss to both the firm and the government. 
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One small firm, whose yearly revenues recently began to exceed the 27.5 million size 
standard, had this to say:  
[In areas such as] software development, cybersecurity, [and] IT 
networking, we have to look to basically be a sub. We can’t really 
compete for that work any longer, even [with regard to] our prime 
contract today…we can’t re-compete for our own work there because of 
the NAICS code [size standards]. 
Indeed, this same firm decided to reorient its business model in order to pursue contracts in 
other NAICS codes:  
We’re focusing now on other parts of our business where we do 
engineering services work, [which has] a higher NAICS code and [and] 
research and development programs. [But] these potential prime 
opportunities…require a business shift for us as far as the talent that we 
have on board. All IT people aren’t necessarily R&D people. 
Another option, of course, is to compete in the full and open category alongside 
established mid-size firms and defense industry giants. Often, graduating small businesses are 
not well positioned to succeed in this environment. According to Rep. Gerald Connolly (D-
VA): “Innovative, high performing small businesses are becoming victims of their own 
success – graduating from small business programs only to find themselves in the untenable 
position of facing off against multi-billion dollar firms” (Weigelt, 2013). 
For instance, Deepak Hathiramani, founder of Vistronix Inc., a Reston, Virginia, 
technology support services company, was so unprepared for the challenges of a mid-tier 
contractor that his company stumbled after growing to $30 million in annual revenue. 
Vistronix had only 15 employees when it landed its first government contract in 1994. For 
nearly a decade later, it thrived on winning small business set-aside contracts providing 
computer systems integration for civilian agencies. By 2003, it was competing against much 
larger corporations for government work. Vistronix was unable to successfully transition into 
its mid-tier status and lost work to its larger rivals. Its annual revenue dropped from $30 
million in 2002 to only $13.5 million in 2004. Additionally, its work force declined to fewer 
than 200 employees, from 400. When small firms become mid-size, they suddenly face a 
broader range of challenges without any type of government assistance. The challenges 
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include inadequate access to sufficient capital, and international competition (Maltby, 2011). 
A former senior OSD official captured an all-too-common scenario: 
If, as a rule, losing one contract or losing two contracts will bankrupt a 
company, then that’s not a healthy situation…The basis ought to be what 
helps the US to have more businesses that are healthy enough to survive 
without special benefits. That’s a problem [graduating] because 
businesses need to grow more slowly. I’ve seen lots of small businesses 
grow too much too fast, and not be able to digest it; then either become a 
not very good company or quickly become other than small basically 
before they’re ready.  
Small businesses are exempt from having comprehensive management information 
tools and infrastructure as part of their business operations. Thus, small businesses may only 
have basic financial management tools to manage their cost accounting. When they graduate, 
government contracts often require more comprehensive financial and management systems, 
and the people to operate these systems. All these requirements generally add to overhead 
costs, which graduating small businesses have not previously included.  
Some small businesses may pursue yet another option: choose to limit growth and 
remain small to avoid disqualifying themselves for small business set-aside contracts. Rather 
than pursue growth and diversification so as to become independent and financially robust, 
they remain dependent on subsidized federal contracts to survive. These “permanent small 
businesses” may become quite adept in this environment over time. According to one small 
business executive: 
I met with another small business owner…and you won’t believe this. He 
said “I’m in it for the nine years. I’m a retired army guy and I’ve also got 
a background so that I can be a [small disadvantaged business]. My intent 
is to grow it for nine years, make all the money I can and then let it die.” 
Needless to say, this outcome is antithetical to the SBA set-aside program’s primary goal to 
encourage small businesses to hire more employees and grow.  
Barriers to entry 
As discussed, SBA polices create market distortions by, in effect, mandating that federal 
agencies look increasingly to small business to fulfill their professional services requirements 
in order to meet SBA targets.  Complicating matters further is DoD’s shortage of experienced 
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acquisition professionals. A retired senior Air Force contracting official summarized his 
perspective on acquisition personnel as follows:   
There is an obvious challenge when you take people who do not possess 
the depth of experience and you rush them into positions commensurate 
with elders who have held 15 years’ worth of experience before they 
came into the same position. There are some obvious challenges with 
experience level, education and training. There are institutions out there 
that are trying to tackle those challenges, but textbooks and classroom 
training can simply not replace repetition and experience. 
In an effort to circumvent the lengthy solicitation process, government agencies have 
turned increasingly to multiple-award indefinite delivery / indefinite quantity contracts 
(MA/IDIQ), often in the form of Government-wide Acquisition Contracts (e.g. the GSA’s 
OASIS and Alliant contracts) or single-agency multiple award contracts (e.g. the Air Force’s  
NETCENTS). Total procurement obligations under multiple-award contracts exceeded $80 
billion in 2011, double the amount in 2006 (Robinson, 2013).  
Another reason that the government has turned to MA/IDIQs is to avoid bid protests—
i.e. a challenge to the award of a contract, typically lodged by a competitor—which have 
increased significantly over the last decade from 1,352 to 2,561 in 2014 (GAO, 2015). In fact, 
the number of annual bid protests ticked up by five percent alone in 2014, an increase that is 
not insignificant, considering the overall decrease in procurement spending (Burton, 2015).  
Often, agencies rely on two variants of a contract, one that is reserved exclusively for 
small business participation and one that is “unrestricted.” Small businesses that are awarded 
MA/IDIQ contracts compete against other small businesses for individual task orders placed 
by government customers. These customers often view MA/IDIQ contracts as “one stop 
shops” that enable them to quickly and easily meet both their professional services needs and 
their SBA-negotiated small business goals. 
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OASIS and Contracts Consolidation 
In 2013, the GSA launched its One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services (OASIS) in 
response to federal agencies’ requests for a more efficient process by which to hire professional 
services contractors... OASIS is a family of seven separate Government-wide, MA/IDIQ task 
order contracts spanning 28 NAICS codes and six exceptions. There are two versions of each of 
these contracts: one that is unrestricted and another that is reserved for small business.  The 
contracts are referred to individually as “pools.” Each of the seven small business pools is 
designated by a size standard. For instance, “Pool 1” consists of 21 NAICS codes that share the 
$15 million size standard; Pool 4 consists of two NAICS codes, both in R&D, that share the 
1,000 employee size standard When issuing an RFP under the OASIS Program, only one 
contract version (OASIS unrestricted or OASIS Small Business) and only one pool can be 
solicited.  
Because OASIS has no program ceiling and a relatively long period of performance— a five-
year base and one five-year option—the vehicle allows government customers to make long 
term plans to meet their program requirements. Moreover, agencies can reserve task orders for 
exclusive competition among small business categories (e.g. woman-owned, HUBZone) in 
order to meet their SBA goals.  
In small business circles, however, OASIS has been the cause of much controversy and 
consternation. Over the last three years, over $1.3 billion in DoD contracts alone has 
been transferred to OASIS, causing the abrupt displacement of numerous small 
businesses whose contracts are now performed by a relatively small group of 136 
OASIS SB awardees.  
 
But because MA/IDIQs tend to have relatively long periods of performance, often up 
to five years, and few “on ramps,” the contracts tend to limit participation. A government 
contract officer with whom we spoke asserted that “SBSAs are giving small businesses work, 
but you have to be among the select few; there are some winners but there will be a lot of 
losers.” 
According to one small defense firm:  
There are 80,000 small businesses [capable of] supporting DoD and 
you’ve got [only] 129 of them on OASIS. And the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force have decided all of their services work is going to OASIS. How 
does that support the small business industrial base? It kills it. That to me, 
I think, is tied to the number of protests and I think it’s tied to shortages 
in contracting officers and agencies that are so tired of dealing with all 
the regulations that they’re looking for an easy way out. 
Ironically, firms that win these coveted MA/IDIQs may not view them all that favorably 
because they are required to, in effect, bid twice—once for the contract and again for 
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subsequent task orders—a process that can be onerous and expensive, especially for a small 
business. 
One small firm executive categorized MA/IDIQ contracts as a “serious money drain,” and 
stated that   
We shy away from those [MA/IDIQ contracts] tremendously. Multiple 
reasons. One reason is that it runs up B&P [bid and proposal] costs. 
You’re in proposal mode constantly. Also, we’ve seen most of those 
contracts go back to the incumbents time and time again. [And with] 
MA/IDIQs, there’s no protest. It’s not a friendly place for us to play. 
Some firms assert that MA/IDIQ contracts are not structured to facilitate their growth. 
One firm with whom we spoke used to provide customized IT solutions through the Alliant 
GWAC. The firm noted that it had been “very successful on that contract.” However, by the 
end of the contract’s period of performance, the company had exceeded the $27.5 million size 
standard. According to the firm:  
We were no longer able to use that vehicle with which we were very 
successful. And there was no alternative. They didn’t allow you on to what 
you might call the unrestricted, or the large business contract. They just 
said you’re out, as if you had never won… 
This firm’s vice president noted that its revenues in FY 2014 and FY 2015 stood at 
$82 and $84 million, respectively.  He stated that “this year we will close at $50; next year we 
will probably close below that.” 
To be sure, MA/IDIQ contracts can offer benefits to small business awardees that 
traditional contracts cannot. According to 13 CFR 121.404 “If a business is small at the time 
of offer for the Multiple Award Contract, it is small for each order issued against 
the contract.” Moreover, where a concern grows to be other than small, the procuring agency 
may exercise options and still count the award as an award to a small business. Accordingly, a 
small business that exceeds the relevant size standard upon winning one or two task orders 
can continue to compete throughout the life of the contract, which may span five, or even ten, 
years.  
Take, for example, Amyx, a small business founded in 1999. The firm averaged 
approximately $10 million per year in federal contracts between 2010 and 2013. The firm was 
one of the first awardees of the OASIS Small Business contract (Pool 1) when it was launched 
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in 2013. In January of 2017, Amyx was awarded its fifth task order under Oasis valued at 
$189 million over five years (Peck, 2017). During the same time, Amyx was awarded other 
large, high-profile, contracts by the DLA. Despite having exceeded the relevant size standard, 
Amyx will continue to be able to compete for task orders in Pool 1 ($14 million size standard) 
over the course of the next seven years.  
To some, this is seen as patently unfair—as evidence that MA/IDIQs in particular, and 
SBA policy generally, favor a small cadre of successful firms at the expense of a much larger 
group that feels “shut out” from some of the federal government’s most lucrative contracts. 
However, permitting these “mid-sized” firms to compete for small business task orders under 
MA-IDIQs might be viewed as an apt retort to the criticism that MA/IDIQs fail to facilitate 
firms’ growth. What is clear, however, is that the consolidation of contracts into MA/IDIQs, 




Figure 11. Number of pages of federal regulations (Mclaughlin, 2013) 
 
In addition to the barriers to entry posed by increased reliance on MA/IDIQs, small 
businesses must grapple with an increasing number of federal regulations (see Figure 11). The 
total number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations continues to climb, requiring 
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additional administrative attention by both the contractors and the federal acquisition 
workforce. In 2014, Congresswoman Eshoo asserted that the “thousands of pages of 
procurement regulations discourage small innovative businesses from even attempting to 
navigate the rules” (Eshoo Press Release, 2014). One small firm with whom we spoke 
expressed similar sentiments: 
If you’re in the business, you’re used to it [navigating federal regulations]. 
But I pity a new business trying to break into the DoD marketplace with 
the tremendous amount of regulations and the low profit margins. It’s a 
challenge…It seems like DoD seems to be a target for every new pet 
regulation. All of that ends up costing the taxpayer money. It’s a 
challenge. 
This firm also noted that  
 Just putting together a proposal, getting a clearance, a facility clearance, so 
that you can bid on something that may require access to classified 
information. These are almost insurmountable hurdles for companies that 
are small businesses. 
According to another small business executive: 
Brand new small businesses often have no experience with the federal 
government need to learn all of those regulatory hurdles. [This is] a very 
difficult, very challenging area for people who do not know it. And you 
see them violating the rules—not on purpose— and then being penalized. 
They have the [Federal Acquisition Regulations], but I don’t know anyone 
beside the contracting officer who’s actually gone through all of it. 
The SBA Office of Advocacy has studied the impact of regulation on small businesses 
since 1995. In September 2010, the office released the study, which “demonstrated that small 
businesses bear a larger burden from regulations than large businesses” (Crain & Crain 2010). 
To date, little has been done to reduce the burden on small businesses. 
Contracting and economic inefficiency 
Critics have asserted that the timing of small business awards—concentrated at the end 
of the fiscal year—represents agencies’ attempts to meet their annual contracting goals and/or 
obligate remaining agency funds (see Figure 12). By taking advantage of set-aside policy to 
bypass lengthy sourcing, agencies are able to obligate their remaining funds quickly.  
One small business with whom we spoke provided the following perspective:  
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You know that the fiscal year ends for the government in September 30. 
You also know that the federal government is not a business where they 
earn profit or a return on investment—their goal is to spend all of their 
money as fast as they can, so that they can continue to get the same level 
of funding. So when they get to around the August timeframe, they realize 
how much money they have left. If there are some things that they are 
interested in and a small business is able to bring that value to them, they 
can quickly put a sole source out and get rid of that money. 
Needless to say, efforts made to spend funds quickly likely fail to maximize taxpayer value, 
representing yet another unintended outcome of set-aside policy. 
 
Figure 12. Timing of contract awards ($), 10-year average, 2007-2016 (analysis of FPDS data) 
 
NAICS code selection can be another source of inefficiency. With the increasing 
pressure to meet the small business set-aside goals, agencies, on occasion, use an 
inappropriate NAICS code.  
For example, in July of 2012 the Small Business Administration Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (SBA OHA) published a decision in favor of Delphi Research, Inc., declaring 
NAICS code 541712—R&D in the physical, engineering, and life science—inappropriate for 
the subject procurement. Delphi alleged that NASA erred in assigning this NAICS code (size 
standard of 1,500 employees) because “the procurement here . . . does not call for the 
contractor to create new processes or products, and thus cannot properly be characterized as 
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research and development” (Koprince, 2012). SBA OHA ruled that NASA should have 
selected NAICS code 541513: Computer Facilities Management Services, (size standard 
$25.5 million in average annual revenue; SBA OHA, 2012) because it accounted for the 
greatest percentage of the contract’s value. Following the SBA decision, Delphi (which 
presumably had less than $25.5 in average annual receipts), was able to compete against 
similarly-sized small businesses.  
This is not an isolated example. In fact, the term “code shopping” has emerged to 
describe agencies’ attempts to use NAICS codes with larger size standards, ostensibly in an 
effort to attract better, perhaps more experienced, professional services providers, yet still 
meet their small business contracting goals. Because NAICS codes within the professional 
services sector tend to be more open to subjective interpretation than codes in other sectors, 
and because professional services firms often provide diverse and varied services under a 
single contract, there is greater potential for code shopping within the growing professional 
services sector. 
Set-aside policy also creates the potential for significant economic inefficiency within 
the professional services sector. As one mid-sized business executive observes: 
The government is always prone, when it hears about any inequities, to 
create more categories, more numbers, more demographic barriers, or 
segments. We continue to see the proliferation of size standards and 
demographic categories. At some point you have to ask, does the creation 
of these categories become counterproductive? By segmenting the 
industry space, do you force turbulence? Do you force unnecessary churn 
in the market? 
Under SBA set-aside policy, midsize and large professional services providers are declining 
as a share of the total, which can lead to higher prices as a result of less competition among 
established firms.  
A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study concluded that midsize 
firms (these were defined as firms which are too large to be categorized as small but had less 
than $3 billion in total annual revenue) were being “squeezed” out of DoD contracts by both 
large and small contractors. CSIS found that from 1999 to 2009, the share of DoD contracts 
awarded to small businesses increased (from 17.0% to 17.4%) and to large firms increased 
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(from 47.0% to 53.7%), while the share awarded to these midsize firms decreased (from 
36.0% to 28.9%; CSIS 2012).  
Regarding the concentration of small firms in the professional services sector, a mid-
sized defense firm with whom we spoke offered the following perspective: 
 It doesn’t make sense to have all of our services business go to small 
business, because quite candidly, I’m not sure what that really does for the 
nation. To all of a sudden have these body shops that are now small 
businesses…well, these businesses often struggle. 
The firm commented that its defense customers began to turn to small businesses in 2012 and 
2013, when the government placed renewed emphasis on meeting set-aside goals. The firm 
noted that  
As our contracts came up for re-compete, our customers were very up 
front about it. They said, ‘hey, we don’t want to go small business, we 
don’t think it makes any sense. But we are being forced to go small 
business.’ So we saw a very significant squeeze. A contract may have had 
20 or 30 of our people and now it’s up for re-compete; all of a sudden, 
it’s going to be a small business contract. 
There is currently renewed support for government assistance for mid-tier firms. 
Groups such as the Mid-Tier Advocacy (MTA), which describes itself as a non-partisan 
organization made up of the country’s top veteran-owned, services disabled, hub-zone 
certified, minority-owned and woman-owned businesses are pushing the government to help 
small firms service the next phase of their business when they face off against the major 
federal contractors.  
MTA lobbies for the recognition of mid-tier businesses as an industry-size category 
between large and small businesses. However, critics argue that additional legislation to 
protect mid-sized firms would provide a “permanent crutch,” merely extending subsidies for 
small firms that have graduated but remain incapable of building their own infrastructure.  
As discussed previously, when small firms serve as primes on large contracts, they can 
often face a disadvantage with their limited “reach-back” capabilities; the firm may not have 
the resources to contact other experts to answer questions, or help identify solutions. 
Consequently, larger firms may be better suited for some professional services contracts 
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because they are more heavily capitalized with in-house test capabilities and services. 
According to one retired senior Air Force contracting official: 
I do not believe, in many cases, that these small firms [have the reach back 
capability]. When I look at the magnitude of some of these efforts that 
have been put on to the backs of small businesses, I don’t believe they 
have the full capability of performing it. In many cases, they don’t have 
the financial wherewithal; they’re not capitalized sufficiently to provide 
certain types of capabilities that the government has qualified as services.  
When the small prime lacks the infrastructure and capabilities to perform the 
contracted effort, it may turn to a large, experienced firm for the subcontracted effort (limited 
by law to 49% of the contract). This puts the large firm in a rather awkward position, as it is 
now being “managed” by the small firm, even though it likely possesses more expertise and 
depth. Some argue that this arrangement increases costs to the government by effectively 
increasing the overhead rate that it pays (Hillmer, 2012). The intent of the small business set-
aside programs is to grow small, and, in many cases, disadvantaged businesses to become 
competitors for additional contracts. When these companies exist simply as shells or as “pass-
throughs,” they fail to meet the objectives of the SBSA program. According to a senior 
defense official:  
Anytime the small business is working in name only, this causes the DoD 
to simply pay a mark-up fee of 2% to 8%. This is detrimental and unfair to 
the taxpayer when we blindly give work to smalls…and that’s when you 
get the shell companies to emerge.  
Until recently, such a heavy reliance on a large teammate also diminished the 
opportunity space for other small firms to participate in that the small firm was required to 
perform 51% of the work; on the other hand, a large prime contractor could spread a greater 
percentage of subcontracted work among a greater number of small firms. As discussed 
previously, the SBA implemented a new rule whereby a small business prime contractor can 
“take credit” for work performed by “similarly-situated” subcontractors thereby allowing 
small business prime contractors to perform less than the mandated performance percentages, 
provided that the subcontractor(s) are “similarly-situated” small firms. This rule is a step in 
the right direction. 
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The SBA’s subcontracting goals for prime contractors may also generate inefficiency. 
One firm, a mid-sized firm, describes a situation in which it was subcontracted to support a 
major defense contractor. However, in an effort to meet its subcontracting goals, the defense 
contractor encouraged the firm to partner with a small business who would lead the effort. 
Unfortunately, the firm came to find that “the small business just didn’t have that heritage, so 
they couldn’t hire the people” The small business told the firm that “your people will have to 
switch badges and come to us or else we’re going to lose the contract.” According to the firm, 
“It was just a constant battle trying to help them [the small business] be successful, and yet 
their primary objective was to take as many of our people as they could.” For mid-sized firms 
who are already feeling “squeezed,” this is an unfortunate outcome. 
There are other reasons why small business may not provide government with the best value:  
• Higher regulatory cost: An SBA study shows that businesses with 20 employees or 
fewer pay 36 percent more per employee on fixed regulatory costs than large business 
counterparts (Crain, 2010).   
• Reduced buying power: Small businesses do not have the benefits of a large 
businesses’ “buying power,” and this contributes to higher overhead and fringe 
benefits costs 
• Fewer employees: Small businesses are often  “top heavy”, and have much fewer 
direct-charge employees against which to spread government regulatory costs (noted 
above) 
• Difficulty obtaining financing: Small businesses have more difficulty securing low-
cost financing, which can increase contract start-up costs.     
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V. Findings and Recommendations 
Within the DoD, small business procurement is not evenly distributed across industry 
sectors; rather it is increasingly concentrated in a few sectors, including, most notably, the 
professional services sectors. Consequently, small business set-aside policy, in its current 
implementation, can result in unintended consequences for small business and for 
government. The following is a summary of our findings: 
• Although DoD has generally had difficulty achieving its small business goals, the 
department has exceeded its goal for the past two years in a climate when spending 
has generally been decreasing.  One can only hope the goal isn’t being achieved at the 
expense of mission performance. 
• Since much of the DoD’s spending in unsuitable for small business, agencies’ meet 
their small business contracting goals by increasing their spending in the professional 
services sector.  This results in decreasing the demand for established, and often better 
qualified, mid-sized and large firms, as well as graduating small businesses. 
• The burden imposed by a large and increasing number of federal regulations often 
places a greater toll on small businesses. 
• Some small professional services providers are receiving larger contracts, hastening 
their growth trajectory such that they are no longer eligible for set-asides; often, these 
providers lack the capability to compete under free and open competition.   
• This trend also means that in many cases small business must subcontract with a large 
business that will perform work in areas where the small business has limited 
capabilities. In some instances, the small business acts as “a pass-through” that offers 
limited or even negative value to government. 
• The proliferation of small firms in the professional services sector, combined with a 
declining acquisition workforce, has fueled increased reliance on multiple award 
contracts.  This then often favors a select small group of small firms, but shuts out 
many others.  
• Government agencies, on occasion, have resorted to the practice of “code shopping” 
in an effort to obtain the best of both worlds: the services of a larger, more qualified, 
“small” business and credit towards their small business contracting goals.  This 
offers the benefits of the SBSA program to unintended recipients. 
• The majority of small business contracts are awarded in the 4th quarter of the fiscal 
year.  The reasons for this are unclear.  However, when government agencies obligate 
funds quickly, the result may not be in the best value to the government. 
• The complex regulatory environment, especially within the DoD, SBA size standards 
(revenue or number of employees) for small business that vary across more than one 
thousand industries, in addition to goals for prime and subcontracting that differ by 
agency and type of small business (e.g. minority-owned, women-owned, etc.) create a 
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complex environment that requires a dedicated bureaucracy and increases transaction 
costs.   
• SBA policies have clearly facilitated some small firms’ growth, however uneven or 
unsustainable. But does the growth of today’s small businesses come at the expense of 
tomorrow’s? Because current revenues form the basis of future size standard 
determinations, many growing industries within the professional services sector may 
be subjected to upward revisions, thereby limiting new entrants’ access, perhaps 
hindering innovation. 
Based on our analysis of FPDS data and our examination of the unintended consequences that 
derive from set-aside policy, we offer the following recommendations.  
Set reasonable set-aside goals. 
At present, the government-wide small business contracting targets (overall small 
business, minority-owned, HUBzone, etc.) have little empirical basis. As for individual 
agency goals, consideration should be given to the development of a goal that includes both 
prime and subcontract dollars. At present, agencies must develop separate prime contracting 
goals and subcontracting goals. As discussed, the prime contracting goals are weighted much 
more heavily than the subcontracting goals in agency scorecards. This methodology 
underrepresents small business participation in federal contracting. An agency may rely 
extensively on small business via major supplier subcontracting, yet earn a low grade. This 
makes little sense. By combining goals, government agencies have increased flexibility to 
meet changing mission requirements, without limiting small business participation.  
Preserve the “Similarly-Situated Entities” Rule. 
In terms of improving flexibility, the SBA’s “Similarly-Situated Entities” Final Rule is 
a step in the right direction. Rather than attempt to perform 51% of the contract on its own or, 
worse, serve merely as a pass-through for a large firm, the rule encourages a small prime 
contractor with limited capabilities to team with other small firms in the delivery of a product 
or service, thereby reducing the risk to government while encouraging increased small 
business participation in federal contracting. 
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Evaluate the impact of set-asides on the industrial base. 
Ensure that there are enough free and open opportunities so that best graduating small 
businesses and mid-sized firms are afforded an opportunity to continue thrive within the 
federal contracting space. 
Review NAICS code descriptions.  
The SBA has defined these size standards for groups of industry.  When these groups 
are too broad, the codes can provide enough ambiguity so that an inappropriate code (and, as a 
result, size standards) can be used. Consequently, an inappropriate set of firms are subsidized 
to the exclusion of the intended recipients. These definitions and thresholds must be clear and 
unambiguous.  
Use set-asides for acquisitions only when small business can handle them. 
When given the appropriate contracts, small businesses can successfully perform as, or 
more, efficiently than a large business.  The key is selecting the suitable opportunities that are 
within the scope and scale of the small business, so that selecting a small business prime does 
not create a risk of poor performance. Small business set-asides are suitable when they enable 
a firm to grow, but do not overwhelm its infrastructure or capabilities. Awarding a contract to 
a firm that is beyond its capacity will cause the company to have difficulty with that work, 
and may cause it to fail. Agencies should refrain from awarding large contracts that approach 
or exceed the industry size standard. Large contracts have the potential to overwhelm small 
firms’ infrastructure and capabilities. Moreover, these contracts prematurely hasten a small 
firm’s growth trajectory, often to a point where the firm is no longer eligible to receive set-
asides. 
Cap eligibility for set-asides.  
At the same time, the SBA should encourage the best firms to grow and discourage 
firms that have no inclination to grow beyond the relevant industry size standards. Small firms 
should be made eligible for set-asides for a predetermined (perhaps industry-specific) number 
of years, after which they would be required to compete under free and open competition. 
Such a policy would encourage innovation by creating greater opportunities and reducing 
barriers to entry for new entrants into the defense contracting space.  
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Review the use of MA/IDIQs and GWACs. 
Reliance on IDIQ vehicles as convenient tools for flexible contracting has helped 
reduce the transaction costs associated with many programs. However, IDIQ contracts have 
the potential to limit overall competition since potential vendors are preselected for extended 
periods. Small businesses that are not awarded IDIQs in their industry are effectively “shut 
out” of some of the federal government’s most lucrative opportunities. Additionally, those 
fortunate enough to be awarded IDIQs face high bid and proposal costs (relative to traditional 
contract solicitations), in that they must bid on the initial contract and then again for each 
individual task order placed under that contract. These costs increase the firm’s indirect costs, 
which are borne by the government and can make the firm less competitive.  
Strengthen the government acquisition workforce. 
Shortfalls within the government acquisition workforce are partially responsible for 
agencies’ increasing reliance on GWAC and other MA/IDIQ contract vehicles.  
Reduce the Regulatory Burden. 
The increasing number of federal regulations poses a significant burden on small 
businesses, which have limited means to carry out and ensure compliance. In order to take 
advantage of innovative offerings from small business, the government—and, in particular, 
the DoD—must provide a business-friendly environment so as to attract the best innovative 
small businesses, especially those that also have commercial opportunities. 
Conclusion 
As Milton Friedman once remarked, “One of the great mistakes is to judge policies 
and programs by their intentions rather than their results.” Current federal policy with 
respect to small business set-asides was formed, and is implemented, with the best of 
intentions.  However, as with many policy initiatives there can be unintended 
consequences. The government must strike a balance that encourages the growth of 
innovative small businesses while ensuring that its contracting needs are met in way that is 
responsible, effective, and efficient. Small business set-aside policy, in its current 
implementation, does not strike the optimal balance.   
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